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INTRODUCTION 
Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum may be one of the world’s most 
feared and resilient warlords.  As a young man in Soviet–occupied 
Afghanistan, he rose to command thousands of Soviet–backed troops 
fighting the mujahedeen rebels.  Later, after the Soviets withdrew and as 
Afghanistan descended into chaos, he carved out and ruthlessly controlled a 
swath of territory in northern Afghanistan, forging and breaking numerous 
alliances along the way.  After a brief period of exile, he returned shortly 
after the September 11 attacks and again became a critical player in Afghan 
politics.  Frequent allegations of atrocities followed Dostum and his forces, 
including rumors that his forces executed political opponents and prisoners.1   
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In the spring of 2002, Dostum reportedly called together all ninety of his 
senior commanders and required them to listen as an aide read out loud a 
human rights report detailing abuses they had committed.  The warlord 
reminded his commanders that an international court was about to come into 
existence and that they could be prosecuted for any future transgressions.2  
It was precisely this dynamic that advocates of the International Criminal 
Court(“ICC” or “the court”) predicted would occur around the world.  They 
argued that a permanent court would deter violators in ways that 
geographically limited ad hoc criminal tribunals, such as those in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, could not.3  A standing court would present 
potential wrongdoers with the constant possibility of investigation and 
punishment.  In short, the court would prevent crime as well as punishing it.  
Since the court has become operational, influential voices have encouraged 
the court to embrace this preventive potential, and senior ICC officials have 
repeatedly proclaimed their intent to do so.4  Indeed, in June 2009, the ICC 
prosecutor appointed a special adviser to assist on prevention issues.5   
Observers are divided over whether the court can serve as an effective 
preventive mechanism.  Legal scholars have tried to predict the court’s 
preventive effect, drawing on the experience of other international tribunals, 
the ICC’s architecture, and its first years of experience.6  A political 
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 1. See Profile: General Rashid Dostum, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2001, 17:43 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1563344.stm. 
 2. See Ilene R. Prusher, Battling Warlords Try Civility: A Grim Human-Rights 
Report Spurred Afghan Warlords to Agree to Stop Targeting Civilians, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 9, 2002, at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Parliamentarians for Global Action, A Deterrent International Criminal 
Court—The Ultimate Objective, 
http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/deterrent%20paper%20rev%20Tokyo.pdf (quoting 
Arthur Robinson, former president of Trinidad & Tobago, arguing that, if a permanent 
tribunal had existed before violence erupted in Bosnia and Rwanda, those crises might have 
been avoided or mitigated) (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
 4. See Statement by Antoine Bernard, Int’l Fed. for Human Rights, Public Hearing 
of the Office of the Prosecutor (June 17-18, 2003). 
 5. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Juan E. Méndez as 
Special Adviser on Crime Prevention (June 19, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282009
%29/pr425.  Mendez previously served as an advisor to then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan regarding the prevention of genocide. 
 6. See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(canvassing and assessing the various studies on the ICC’s preventive impact); Julian Ku & 
Jide Nzilebe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian 
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787-90 (2006); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: 
Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); 
Major Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of 
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scientist has employed theoretical models of individual behavior to analyze 
the court’s likely deterrent effect.7  An economist has examined how 
international prosecution will affect the cost–benefit calculations of national 
leaders.8  Others have questioned whether crime prevention—and 
deterrence in particular—is an appropriate objective for the institution and 
have encouraged the court and the international community to prioritize 
other goals.9  
What has not been adequately examined is the extent to which the goal 
of prevention is actually influencing the work and decisions of the court.  
Prevention of future crimes is a natural goal for the court, but it is not the 
only one that might guide its activities.  Other goals could include achieving 
justice (regardless of the preventive effect), establishing a historical record, 
fostering reconciliation, and maintaining peace.  These goals will sometimes 
overlap and reinforce each other, but not in all cases, and the court’s own 
view of its priorities matters.     
Examining the policy goals at work in the court is particularly important 
given the wide latitude that the ICC prosecutor and the judges have in 
developing a strategy for the institution.10  The court’s statute and other key 
documents offer little guidance on policy goals or how they should be 
prioritized.  Unlike national courts, there is no expectation that the ICC will 
pursue all—or perhaps even most—of the crimes that fall under its 
jurisdiction.  As a former international prosecutor has argued, “[t]he main 
distinction between domestic enforcement of criminal law, and the 
international context, rests upon the broad discretionary power granted to 
the international Prosecutor in selecting the targets for prosecution.”11  The 
court does not have the resources to pursue all the cases over which it has 
jurisdiction.  “If only for reasons of cost and capacity,” one ICC judge 
  
Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156 (2001); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the 
Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 477 (1999). 
 7. See Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of 
the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG., 935 (2006). 
 8. See Daniel Sutter, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court, in 
23 CONFERENCES IN NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 9 (2006).  
 9. See Pablo Castillo, Rethinking Deterrence: The International Criminal Court in 
Sudan, 13 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS 167 (2007); Kenneth A. Rodman, Darfur and the 
Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 529 (2008). 
 10. For assessments of the prosecutor’s discretion and the exercise thereof, see 
William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 731 (2008) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Discretion]; 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583 (2007); Luc Côté, Reflections 
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 162 (2005); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 510 (2003). 
 11. Justice Louise Arbour, The Need for an Independent and Effective Prosecutor in 
the Permanent International Criminal Court, 17 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 207, 213 
(1999). 
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argued recently, “the Court will never be able to do more than conduct a 
few, exemplary trials.”12  
This element of discretion is enhanced by another aspect of the ICC’s 
architecture.  In national legal systems, the legislative and the executive 
branches will typically establish policy goals and metrics for the judicial 
system.  Policymakers can respond to prosecutorial decisions and court 
actions via additional legislation or regulation and thereby adjust the 
priorities of the judicial system.  There is, in effect, a dialogue between the 
branches of government that keeps courts and judges in touch with the 
policy goals and priorities of the legislative and executive branches.  
Politically appointed or elected prosecutors, in particular, will respond 
readily to the policy goals of the government and the public more broadly.   
It is not clear that this dynamic operates at the ICC.  The prosecutor serves 
one, nonrenewable nine–year term and therefore may not be particularly 
sensitive to political guidance or pressure.13  Given that the ICC has more 
than one hundred member states, the political and policy signals that it does 
receive are likely to be confused and contradictory. 
Moreover, the ICC in many respects lacks the institutional interlocutors 
that national prosecutors have.  The Assembly of States Party (ASP)—
comprised of all states that have ratified the Rome Statute—is effectively 
the legislative arm of the court.  It meets annually, elects judges and the 
prosecutor, and considers statements and resolutions.  Seven years after the 
Rome Statute entered into force, the ASP acquired the ability to amend the 
statute.14  Thus far, however, the ASP has not engaged in oversight or 
dialogue with the court in the way that a national legislature would.  The 
first ever ICC review conference, held in June 2010 in Uganda, offered a 
more developed format for dialogue between states and the court, but it 
focused largely on defining the crime of aggression rather than discussing 
the court’s methods and policy goals.15  
The UN Security Council (“Council”) might also be a potential 
communicator of policy goals to the court, but the Council’s role in court 
  
 12. Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice-President of the Int’l Criminal Court, Peace 
Through Justice? The International Criminal Court in the Hague 15 (Nov. 2, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B7BC9709-394D-4449-AA08-
4182A98C567B/281395/JudgeKaulSpeech.pdf.  
 13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 42, para. 4, July 12, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 900 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  The prosecutor’s independence was seen as a 
virtue by many of the drafters of the Rome Statute.  But political pressure may not always be 
negative, and it may contain important signals about the intention of states that should factor 
into the court’s decisions. 
 14. See Id art. 121.  A variety of amendments were considered at the Review 
Conference held in Kampala, Uganda in May/June 2010.  See ASP Working Group on 
Amendments, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=asp-wgoa (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).  
 15. See, e.g., David Scheffer, State Parties Approve New Crimes for International 
Criminal Court (ASIL Insight, Wash. D.C.), June 22, 2010. 
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operations is, by design, quite limited.16  The Council may refer cases, delay 
investigations, and expand the jurisdiction of the court to non–states parties, 
but it otherwise has no role in court decisions on which cases to pursue.  
The court’s latitude in defining its scope of activity and the absence of close 
oversight make an examination of the goals and policy considerations 
influencing the court critical.      
This Article will assess in several stages how the goal of crime 
prevention is affecting the court.  First, and briefly, it will outline the 
relevant structural elements and procedures of the court and define several 
key concepts related to prevention and deterrence.  Second, it will review 
the debates and discussions that preceded the adoption of the Rome Statute 
with an eye to what role the drafters believed the goal of prevention should 
play in the court’s operations.  Certain provisions in the Rome Statute, the 
court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
own guidelines that bear on prevention will be discussed.  
This Article’s most extensive section will survey the court’s more than 
eight years of operation to assess whether and how court personnel are 
pursuing the goal of crime prevention.  The court’s work is still in the early 
stages—no case has yet been completed—but it is possible to make an 
initial assessment.  This part of the analysis will move through the various 
stages of the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions—from preliminary 
investigation through sentencing.  This Article concludes with observations 
on whether and how the court should attempt to maximize its preventive 
impact.  It notes that discussion of prevention serves a strategic purpose for 
the court at a time when other more quantifiable achievements are limited.  
It urges the court to move beyond rhetoric to develop a comprehensive 
prevention strategy that can guide the court, particularly as the prosecutor 
decides where to focus its activities and as the court considers how to 
conduct its public outreach. 
I.  DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS 
A.  The ICC Structure and Role 
The ICC was designed as a court of last resort that would prosecute those 
responsible for certain serious crimes when national jurisdictions proved 
unwilling or unable to do so.  This “complementarity” regime means that 
the ICC seeks to work together with national judicial systems to investigate 
and prosecute the crimes listed in the Rome Statute and only launches 
  
 16. The Security Council’s role in the court’s operations was one of the most divisive 
issues during the negotiations that led to the Rome Statute. For an examination of this debate, 
see William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All 
About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701 (2004). 
168 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
prosecutions of its own when national courts cannot or will not.17  (Indeed, 
the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno–Ocampo, has argued on several occasions 
that the court could be a success without holding trials, so long as it 
encourages national court systems to prosecute offenders.)18  
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
aggression, and certain war crimes committed on the territory of a state 
party or by an individual who is a citizen of an ICC member state.  The 
court’s Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence defined all these 
crimes, with the exception of aggression.19  That crime has been the subject 
of considerable debate and controversy.  The 2010 Review Conference 
reached agreement on a definition of the crime of aggression but also 
determined that the court would not acquire jurisdiction until a two–thirds 
vote by the Assembly of States Parties sometime after January 2017.20  The 
UN Security Council may expand the jurisdiction of the court through a 
resolution under its Chapter VII powers and has done so in the case of 
Sudan, which is not a state party.21 
The court has three principal components: the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP), the judicial divisions (including pre–trial, trial, and appeals 
chambers), and the Registry, which is responsible for the non–judicial 
administration of the court, including certain outreach and informational 
activities.  A president of the court is selected from among the judges and is 
responsible for the judicial administration of the court.  The ICC also has 
several smaller components, including offices of public counsel for victims 
and for the defense. 
The task of identifying and investigating crimes falls to the OTP.  States 
parties and the Security Council may refer cases, but in all situations the 
final decision to pursue cases falls to the prosecutor.  He or she may also 
  
 17. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 17, para. 1(a). 
 18. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Statement 
made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l 
Criminal Court 3 (June 16, 2003), http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D7572226-264A-4B6B-
85E3-2673648B4896/143585/030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor’s most recent strategy document reiterates the point, noting that “the number of 
cases that reach the Court is not a positive measure of effectiveness.” Int’l Criminal Court 
[ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, para. 79 (Feb. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012]. 
 19. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Aggression, Legitimacy, and the International 
Criminal Court, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2009); Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for 
the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2001-2001). 
 20. Scheffer, supra note 15. 
 21. S.C. Res 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  For commentary on the 
referral, see John E. Tanagho & John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds 
To Darfur: ICC Prosecution Renews Hope for International Justice, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. 
REV. 367, 386 (2009); Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council's Referral of the Crimes in 
Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: 
Implications for the International Criminal Court's Functions and Status,  24 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 650 (2006). 
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initiate cases that have not been referred; in this respect, the prosecutor has 
proprio motu powers.22  The prosecutor’s discretion is significantly limited, 
however, by the pre–trial chamber, composed of three judges.  This 
chamber must determine that there is a “reasonable basis” for opening 
formal investigations and must review requests to issue indictments, 
summons, and arrest warrants.23  Decisions of the pre–trial and trial 
chambers can be reviewed by an appeals chamber.  Upon determination of 
guilt, the trial chamber issues a sentencing decision, which may also be 
appealed.24 
The ICC has no independent enforcement powers.  It is entirely 
dependent on the ability and willingness of states to provide resources, 
cooperate with the court’s requests for information and, ultimately, enforce 
arrest warrants.  States parties to the Rome Statute are under an obligation 
to assist the court, and the Security Council may also create legal 
obligations to assist the court and enforce its decisions. 
B. Deterrence and Prevention 
The goals and purposes of criminal law have been widely debated, but 
there is general acceptance that processes of investigation and punishment 
have both backward–looking and forward–facing elements.25  The 
prevention of future crimes—the focus of this article—is only one of several 
purposes that a system of punishment may have.  Retribution, in effect, a 
structured and controlled system of vengeance, is a powerful alternative 
purpose.26  Rehabilitation may also be an alternative purpose that seeks to 
convert offenders into responsible citizens.  Although rehabilitation can 
have preventive effects, its advocates often see it primarily as a matter of 
individual rights and basic humanity.27  
When discussion does turn explicitly to crime prevention, the concept of 
deterrence often dominates, and it has done so in the context of the ICC.   
  
 22. Early drafts of a statute for the court denied the prosecutor this power. See 
William Schabas, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 120 (2001). 
 23. Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 57-58. 
 24. Id. at arts. 76, 84. 
 25. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: 
A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. R. 1 
(2003). 
 26. Retribution has moved in and out of favor as a purpose of punishment but has 
never disappeared.  See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313 
(2000); See generally Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution—An Examination 
of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781. 
 27. See, e.g., Ramsey Clark, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, 
CAUSES, PREVENTION, AND CONTROL 220 (1970) (arguing first that rehabilitation is a form of 
“individual salvation,” but also that it is “the one clear way that criminal justice processes 
can significantly reduce crime.”).  
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Indeed, one delegate at the Rome Conference in 1998 made the concepts of 
deterrence and prevention almost one and the same.  “A particular 
advantage [of the ICC] would be its preventive role,” he argued, “through 
its deterrent effect on potential criminals, thereby strengthening efforts to 
maintain peace and stability in the world.”28  As will be discussed below, 
deterrence does not remotely exhaust the subject of prevention, but it is a 
critical component.  
1. Deterrence 
The literature on deterrence and criminal law is vast, although most of it 
approaches the issue from the perspective of national legal systems.  Legal 
scholars, criminologists, philosophers, sociologists, and economists have all 
explored the concept.  In part because of the volume of contributions on the 
issue, terminology has varied considerably.29  For the purposes of this 
Article, the following concepts will be used.  General deterrence refers to 
the discouragement of criminal activity through fear of punishment among 
the general public—i.e., those who have not been legally punished.  The 
ICC hopes to deter the crimes it has jurisdiction to prosecute, namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes.  As an 
international institution, the ICC’s general deterrent effect should reach 
around the globe, and at the very least to the populations of countries that 
are members of the court.30   
Specific deterrence refers to the discouragement of subsequent criminal 
activity by those who have been punished.  The concept is of limited 
relevance to an enterprise like the ICC.  As James Alexander has argued, 
“[o]ne struggles to name any historical occurrence in which an individual 
has been convicted of a crime like genocide by an international tribunal, 
served time, was released, and then found himself or herself in a second 
situation in which he or she might again commit genocide.”31  Instead, this 
article uses the term targeted deterrence to refer to attempts by the court to 
deter specific individuals or groups within a society.32  The court could 
pursue targeted deterrence in several ways.  First, the court may seek to 
  
 28. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 4th plen. mtg. ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 
1998) (comment by Mr. Michalek, Austria).   
 29. See Jack P. Gibbs, Deterrence Theory and Research, in THE LAW AS A 
BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 87, 87-88 (Gary B. Melton, ed., 1986) [hereinafter Deterrence 
Theory]. 
 30. While 114 countries are now states parties, many of the world’s most populous 
countries have not joined the court. The United States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Egypt among others remain outside the system. Together, 
non-states parties account for approximately 70 percent of world population. 
 31. Alexander, supra note 6, at 22. 
 32. The concept has been used sparingly in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Tom R. 
Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness, 81 B.U.L. REV. 361, 396 (2001). 
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deter selected individuals from continued criminal activity by issuing arrest 
warrants or summons.  In so doing, the court might not expect that the 
individuals would be detained but may hope that a warrant or summons 
would nonetheless deter them from further criminal conduct.  This scenario 
is particularly relevant for the ICC, which has already created a small pool 
of indicted but still at–large individuals.33  Targeted deterrence may also 
take a somewhat broader form.  The court might seek to prevent a particular 
violent scenario from occurring through public statements and warnings 
directed at political or ethnic leaders.  For example, if the context of a 
previous round of violence and atrocities was a disputed election, the court 
might seek to prevent a recurrence of that violence during the next round of 
elections.   
At certain points, this article also discusses the concept of restrictive 
deterrence, which refers to the minimization—rather than the 
abandonment—of criminal activity.  Restrictive deterrence has occurred 
“when, to diminish the risk or severity of a legal punishment, a potential 
offender engages in some action that has the effect of reducing his or her 
commissions of a crime.”34  A warlord or militia commander who, in an 
effort to avoid the ICC’s attentions, instructs his forces to avoid large–scale 
massacres while continuing to commit certain war crimes covered by the 
Rome Statute (e.g., the recruitment of child soldiers) would demonstrate the 
effects of restrictive deterrence.    
2.  Prevention 
A law enforcement system can discourage criminal activity through 
means other than fear of punishment, and this broader concept of prevention 
must also be examined.  Punishment can incapacitate offenders and thus 
render these individuals unable to commit new crimes.35  If punishment 
satisfies the retributive desires of those affected by a crime, the system may 
prevent crimes motivated by the desire for revenge.  Individualization of 
guilt can facilitate group reconciliation and help prevent violent reprisals.36  
As Johannes Andenaes has argued, public awareness of potential 
punishment for certain activity can have an educative effect that generates 
  
 33. Prominent indicted individuals still at large include Sudanese president Omar Al-
Bashir, Lord’s Resistance Army commander Joseph Kony, and Congolese warlord Bosco 
Ntganda. 
 34. Deterrence Theory, supra note 29, at 89. 
 35. See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 58-60 (1975) 
[hereinafter CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE]. 
 36. See Catherine Lu, The ICC as an Institution of Moral Regeneration, in BRINGING 
POWER TO JUSTICE? THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 191, 199 
(2006).  But see David Wippman, Exaggerating the ICC, in BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE?, 
supra, at 99, 120 (arguing that “members of politically polarized ethnic communities are at 
least as likely to interpret prosecutions in ways that confirm existing biases as they are to see 
them as neutral confirmations of individual rather than collective guilt.”). 
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moral disapprobation of the activity in question and consequently reduces 
the occurrence of that activity.  It may be the disapprobation, rather than the 
threat of punishment, that reduces the occurrence of the proscribed 
activity.37  Other scholars contend that a system of punishment can validate 
and strengthen existing norms against proscribed behavior, habituate lawful 
conduct, and limit the normative influence of perpetrators, thus 
discouraging imitation.38  In this realm, the ICC’s lack of effective 
enforcement power—so often cited as a critical weakness—may not be 
debilitating.39  According to Catherine Lu, “the moral authority of the ICC 
is not necessarily undermined by its political weakness; the lack of 
endorsement by the world’s most powerful states may even boost its moral 
legitimacy.”40 
II. PREVENTION AND THE ROME STATUTE 
The language of deterrence was ubiquitous at the Rome Conference in 
the summer of 1998 as national delegates—supported and prodded by a 
variety of nongovernmental organizations—negotiated the terms of the new 
court.  A succession of diplomats expressed the view that the court’s 
existence would deter serious violations of humanitarian law.41  Canada’s 
  
 37. JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 35-36 (1974).  
 38. See Deterrence Theory, supra note 29, at 87-93. 
 39. For notable criticisms of the court on enforcement grounds see, for example, Jack 
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92 
(2003) (noting that the ICC has no inherent enforcement capacity and is dependent on state 
enforcement powers); John Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 176 (2001) (“A weak and distant court will have no 
deterrent effect on the hard men like Pol Pot most likely to commit crimes against 
humanity.”). 
 40. Lu, supra note 36, at 203. 
 41. Representative examples include statements by the South Korean representative 
(“Bringing to justice the perpetrators of crimes of international concern would serve as an 
effective deterrent”), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, 2nd plen. mtg. ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) 
(June 15, 1998); the Romanian delegate (“A permanent, universal, independent and strong 
international criminal court empowered to prosecute and convict persons responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes would not only overcome the 
disadvantages of ad hoc tribunals but would also act as a potential deterrent.”), U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, 3rd plen. mtg. ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); the 
delegate from Burkina Faso (“The limitations of the ad hoc tribunals set up in connection 
with those tragedies had demonstrated the need for a permanent international court, which 
would also serve as a deterrent to potential criminals.”), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 4th plen. mtg. ¶ 
31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); and the delegate from Bahrain (“the 
purpose of establishing an international criminal court was to act as a deterrent against the 
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delegate, for example, insisted that “an independent and effective 
international criminal court would help to deter some of the most serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”42  An international criminal 
court, predicted one advocacy group, would be “a veritable sword of 
Damocles hanging over the head of all warlords and their henchmen.”43     
Deterrence was also discussed in a variety of more specific contexts 
during the negotiations.  Several delegates argued that it could not be 
achieved absent a careful and precise definition of the crimes under the 
court’s jurisdiction.44  Other delegates argued that appropriately severe 
punishment, including the death penalty, would be necessary to create an 
effective deterrent.45  Singapore’s delegate expressed concern that the 
absence of this punishment would reduce the court’s impact, “especially in 
parts of the world where the deprivation of liberty was not an adequate 
deterrent.”46 
The court’s anticipated deterrent function was a particular concern 
during debate on the role of the UN Security Council in the court’s 
operations.  The U.S. delegation advocated requiring a decision of the 
Security Council to initiate an investigation.  U.S. officials stated that 
international criminal justice could only be successful with the support of 
the powerful countries on the Council.  U.S. delegate David Scheffer argued 
that “because the [Security] Council alone among international institutions 
exercises police powers, the design of the court must take into account the 
proper role of the Council.”47  This suggestion that the Security Council 
should  have a central role was vociferously opposed by the “like–minded” 
states—a group that had emerged as the strongest advocate of an 
independent court—and by most of the NGOs involved in the process, who 
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argued that such a structure would dramatically reduce the court’s deterrent 
impact.  The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights warned that a large 
Security Council role would politicize the court’s operations and insisted 
that the court be “bound by legal considerations only if the Court is to play a 
meaningful role in the prevention and punishment of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”48  
Other preventive theories were discussed during the negotiations, 
although far less frequently.  Several delegates, for example, predicted that 
the court would improve chances for reconciliation by offering redress 
through law and thereby preventing cycles of violence.49  But, in general, 
deterrence displaced discussion of broader preventive theories, including 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, education, stigmatization, and moral pressure. 
When the statute was completed, some observers expressed certainty that 
the court’s mere existence would prevent crimes.  William Pace, head of the 
influential Coalition for an International Criminal Court, predicted 
significant results: 
The ICC will deter; the ICC will prevent; the ICC will cause the greatest 
strengthening ever of national legal systems prosecution of crimes against 
humanity.  The ICC will save millions of humans from suffering 
unspeakably horrible and inhumane death in the coming decades.  This is 
an incredible achievement.  This will be part of the legacy of this night.50 
The final text of the Rome Statute itself is considerably less expansive 
than its advocates on the court’s preventive function.  The Statute’s 
preamble provides that the signatories are “determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes.”51  The phrasing suggests that prevention will be 
a consequence of the court’s activities rather than a conscious goal; ending 
impunity will prevent future crimes, but the court’s actual role is 
prosecution.  
The only other explicit reference to deterrence or prevention as a policy 
goal in the statute comes in Article 58(c)(3), which grants the pre–trial 
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chamber the authority to issue an arrest warrant or summons to appear in 
order to, among other reasons, “prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction 
of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.”52  This article 
appears to aim at an incapacitation effect rather than a deterrent one.  The 
presumed intent is to physically remove the individual from the conflict 
zone rather than to deter him through the threat of punishment.  However, it 
is possible that a targeted deterrent effect was intended as well.  It was 
known to the drafters that the court would have no enforcement arm, and 
they likely considered the possibility that a warrant issued under Article 
58(c)(3) would go unenforced.  In that situation, they may have nonetheless 
hoped that the existence of an arrest warrant would lead the individual in 
question to modify his behavior, perhaps in anticipation of an eventual trial 
or out of a desire to demonstrate to observers “clean hands.”    
The ICC’s drafting history indicates a strong desire on the part of many 
drafters to create an institution that would deter and prevent future crimes.  
But the Rome Statute and the subsequently adopted Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence offer little guidance on whether and how the court should seek to 
maximize that effect.  The court’s prosecutor, judges, and administrators are 
now in the process of exploring the court’s preventive potential. 
III. THE COURT IN OPERATION 
The court is now in its eighth year of operation and has active cases at 
several different stages.  As of late 2010, the court was conducting five 
formal investigations, had indicted thirteen individuals, and initiated three 
trials.  At least another nine situations were being monitored by the court.  
The court’s pre–trial chambers and appeals chamber have ruled on several 
different aspects of the court’s operations, primarily on questions related to 
opening investigations, the standards for issuing arrest warrants, and 
victims’ rights and participation.53  It is possible to make an initial 
assessment of whether and how the goal of prevention is influencing the 
court’s deliberations and operations, although certain relevant information-- 
most importantly, the deliberations of the court’s senior leadership--is not 
available.  More than most courts, however, the ICC has attempted to 
explain its reasoning and strategy through press statements, published 
papers, and speeches.  As representatives of a new and fragile institution, 
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ICC officials feel an obligation to explain their actions and educate a variety 
of audiences about the court’s operations. 
In these public statements, prevention is a recurring theme.  Indeed, the 
ICC prosecutor and other senior court officials have claimed on several 
occasions that the court has already had a notable preventive effect.   The 
cases it has pursued on child soldiers in Africa, it is claimed, have had an 
impact in Colombia and Sri Lanka.54  Crimes by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in northern Uganda “have dramatically decreased” as a result of the 
ICC indictment and the group’s recruitment efforts “dried up almost 
instantly” after the indictments.55  The prosecutor himself has contended 
that the Russian armed forces “[tried] to take the Rome Statute into 
consideration when it planned its military campaign in Georgia.”56  More 
broadly, he has argued that “armies all over the world, even those of non–
States Parties, are adjusting their standards and rules of engagement to the 
Rome Statute.  This is the way to prevent crimes.”57  
The prosecutor has pointed to even more specific instances in which the 
court served as an effective deterrent.  Before one audience, he argued that 
the Rome Statute was influencing the battlefield decisions of individual 
combatants: “In 2003 an Australian military pilot conducting operations in 
Iraq realized that if he executed the order received, he could be prosecuted 
in accordance with the Rome Statute.  He returned to his base without 
dropping the bombs.”58 
Observers outside the court have also identified situations in which they 
believe the court’s activities, or at least awareness of the court, has 
prevented crimes.   
After a coup attempt in the Central African Republic, the 
nongovernmental International Federation of Human Rights made a 
widely publicized call for ICC involvement.  The Federation claims that 
the public discussion of an ICC role reduced tension notably in the country 
and may have prevented further atrocities.59  
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It has been reported that the content of government statements in Cote 
d’Ivoire changed after a senior UN official stated that ethnic violence 
might fall under the jurisdiction of the court.  Statements that had been 
aggressive turned more conciliatory.60 
Human Rights Watch researchers have recounted being told certain 
militia commanders in eastern Congo are desperate to avoid being sent to 
[T]he Hague.61  
These claims are anecdotal and there is little empirical research yet on 
whether the ICC has played a preventive role.  Indeed, research on the 
preventive impact of international justice mechanisms in general is limited 
and inconclusive.62  That senior ICC officials have frequently commented 
on the court’s preventive function does not necessarily imply that the court 
is structuring its activity to produce that effect, but it does at least suggest 
that court officials value prevention and see it as a critical indicator of the 
court’s effectiveness.  As the court’s president stated recently: “If only one 
warlord has decided to release his child soldiers, then the ICC can already 
be deemed a success.”63  
The frequent references to the court’s preventive effect may therefore 
serve a pragmatic function.  In the absence of convictions, and faced with 
significant numbers of indictees at large, court officials need some method 
of demonstrating the court’s effectiveness to the public, member states, and 
important non–signatory states.  The prosecutor’s special adviser on 
prevention, Juan Mendez, has suggested that prevention serves as a 
convenient response to criticisms of the ICC.64 
A.  Preliminary Examination 
In advance of a formal investigation, the OTP reviews situations to 
determine whether crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the court have 
been or are being committed.  Information and complaints from individuals 
and organizations outside the court—of which there have been several 
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thousand—are reviewed by the prosecutor and his staff.65  A state party or 
Security Council referral will also lead to a preliminary examination.66 
The prosecutor’s discretion is broad during this phase of the court’s 
work.  Neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
offer the prosecutor any significant guidance on how to conduct preliminary 
examinations, although they do make clear that the prosecutor may seek 
additional information and may take oral or written testimony during this 
phase.67  The prosecutor may monitor a situation without any input from a 
pre–trial chamber and without any temporal limitation.  Perhaps because of 
this leeway, the OTP has sought to use this phase assertively for the 
purposes of prevention.   
Publicity surrounding a preliminary examination has proved to be a key 
tool.  Certain court documents suggest that the process of pre–investigation 
will normally be conducted without publicity and without public statements, 
noting that “[g]enerally, work in a situation does not become public 
knowledge until the Office opens an investigation.”68  The court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence require the prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness 
of information received” but they do not specify whether this is to be done 
publicly.69  The OTP’s own regulations provide only that “the Prosecutor 
may decide to make public the Office’s activities in relation to the 
preliminary examination of information . . . .”70   
During the court’s several years of operation, however, preliminary 
investigations have regularly become public.  In some cases, preliminary 
investigations appear to have had a notable impact on domestic politics as 
well as on international mediation efforts.  In Kenya, for example, the ICC’s 
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prolonged monitoring occasioned significant national debate and influenced 
the work of lead international mediator Kofi Annan.71  The prosecutor’s 
office has embraced the attention that its preliminary investigations receive.   
Even in the absence of a formal requirement, the OTP now routinely reports 
on situations it is monitoring.  As the deputy prosecutor stated, “the Office 
has developed the practice of being as transparent as possible so the 
international community and our partners will know whether there are 
situations which may require investigations to be carried out.”72  In public 
documents, the OTP has stressed the benefits that awareness of ICC 
scrutiny can have:   
[T]he announcement of ICC activities can have a preventive impact.  The 
mere monitoring of a situation can deter future crimes.  It increases the 
risk of punishment even before trials begin.  This effect is not limited to 
the situation under investigation but extends to all State Parties and 
reverberates worldwide.73 
In places like Colombia, the prosecutor has argued, scrutiny itself is 
salutary.  “Because we are there watching, they have to do everything 
perfectly . . . ,” Moreno-Ocampo said.  “Colombia shows how important it 
is to have this back–up system.”74  In 2008, the prosecutor announced that 
his office was examining the conduct of Taliban and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan.  At times, he appeared inclined to use that examination as a 
mechanism for encouraging forward–looking preventive mechanisms.  In 
discussing the inquiry, for example, the prosecutor emphasized policies 
such as appropriate education for the new Afghan armed forces.  “That is 
the most important [thing] because these massive atrocities are planned.  So 
if those who are planning know they will be prosecuted, they will do 
something different.”75  
During certain of its preliminary investigations, the OTP has focused on 
quite specific preventive goals.  The 2008 post–election violence in Kenya 
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was the subject of a preliminary examination for several months before the 
prosecutor sought permission to open a formal investigation in November 
2009.76  During that period, the prosecutor visited Kenya and made 
numerous public statements about the situation.  He pledged that “[w]e will 
do justice, we will work together to avoid a repetition of the crimes . . . . It 
has been two years since the post election violence in Kenya.  In two years 
another election is planned.  The world is watching Kenya and this Court.”77  
He later stressed that the court would try to proceed on a timetable that 
could maximize the chances for prevention.  “Everyone is worried about the 
next election in Kenya in 2012,” he told the press.  “That’s why I 
understand the importance of speed, and I am working to be sure that during 
2010—if the judges authorize investigations—we will be able to complete 
investigations and to define who are the suspects, who are the accused, that 
have to have justice in Kenya. And that will clean the situation [so] that 
you can have peaceful election [seasons] in 2011 and 2012.”78 
In situations where conflict has broken out abruptly, the OTP has 
signaled to combatants that it is scrutinizing events, a clear attempt to use its 
influence to alter the conduct of hostilities.  When fighting erupted between 
Georgian and Russian forces in August 2008, the court released a statement 
indicating that it was analyzing alleged crimes committed during combat 
operations.  The prosecutor also reportedly met with Russian and Georgian 
officials about possible violations committed.79  In other cases, the 
prosecutor has commented on specific incidents in ongoing conflicts.  Just 
two days after a massacre at a refugee camp in Uganda, the prosecutor 
released a statement indicating his intent to investigate, which could be seen 
as an effort to assure the affected Ugandan communities that revenge 
attacks were unnecessary and to thereby help prevent a spiral of violence.80 
When violence broke out in Cote d’Ivoire after a disputed election, the 
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prosecutor publicly warned one individual that his incitements to violence 
might be prosecuted.81 
Further, the OTP has incorporated into its latest strategy document the 
goal of prevention through public monitoring.  It states that the office will 
“make preventive statements noting that crimes possibly falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are being committed . . . [and] make public the 
commencement of a preliminary examination at the earliest possible stage 
through press releases and public statements.”82  The prosecutor has also 
expressed his intent to catalogue and assess the preventive impact of these 
activities, although he has not offered a methodology for doing so.  
Public awareness of ICC monitoring could have important benefits in 
this respect.  In particular, the prosecutor can employ monitoring as a form 
of targeted deterrence in situations where it appears that a recurrence of 
crimes is likely, as is the case in Kenya.  ICC scrutiny may lead combatants 
and political leaders to modify their future behavior in an attempt to 
discourage the prosecutor from seeking a formal investigation or to 
minimize the chances that they will be indicted.  At the same time, it may 
create pressure for national judicial proceedings and the possible 
incarceration of those responsible for crimes.  The prosecutor has, at various 
times, advanced the idea of “positive complementarity”—the notion that the 
court should actively encourage and assist states to conduct their own 
prosecutions and assist them in doing so.83  ICC involvement may serve as 
an effective means of “catalyz[ing] political will toward prosecution in 
situations under analysis.”84   
In theory, the OTP’s choice to highlight and publicize the court’s 
preliminary investigations could create complications for the methodical 
building of a case against perpetrators.  A high degree of publicity about 
prosecutorial activities might lead perpetrators to cover up evidence, destroy 
documentation, and intimidate potential witnesses, steps which could 
complicate construction of a case for trial.  Publicity may also complicate 
the ultimate enforcement of any warrants, as individuals who expect to be 
investigated may go into hiding or make preparations to do so.  It is for this 
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reason that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) often kept indictments secret until they could be enforced.85  
However, these complications might be unavoidable.  It is not clear that the 
OTP could keep a preliminary examination quiet even if it wanted to.  For 
example, news that the prosecutor was examining crimes committed in 
Colombia became public in March 2005 when Colombian lawmakers 
released a letter from Moreno–Ocampo requesting information on alleged 
crimes.86  Given this reality, the OTP has sought to extract as much 
preventive value from preliminary examinations as possible. 
B. Formal Investigations and Indictments 
The Rome Statute provides for increasing judicial oversight of the 
prosecutor when he seeks to begin a formal investigation or to issue 
summons or arrest warrants.  The pre–trial chamber assigned to the case 
must approve of major decisions by the prosecutor.  Even at this stage, 
however, the Rome Statute asks the prosecutor to use his discretion in 
certain limited but important ways.  In contrast to the preliminary 
investigation phase, the prosecutor has at several points resisted the idea of 
using formal investigations for preventive purposes or of requiring an 
assessment of the preventive effects of its formal steps.  
1. Abstention as Prevention  
The simplest way in which the court might factor prevention into its 
calculus at this stage is by deciding that formal investigation and indictment 
risk inciting additional crimes and therefore choosing not to pursue them.  
The possibility that ICC involvement would itself be the cause of violations 
has been raised as a theoretical possibility by observers and critics.  The 
argument has taken several forms.  A court investigation or indictment of a 
prominent politician or commander might spark a violent backlash by 
supporters.  An existing indictment might make an accused leader more 
committed to staying in power, including through the use of violent 
repression and atrocities.    
It did not take long for the issue to present itself as more than an abstract 
possibility.  One of the court’s earliest formal investigations was the 
situation in Uganda, which was referred to the court by the Ugandan 
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government.87  The referral specifically referenced the activities of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, led by Joseph Kony.  The court’s involvement in 
Uganda soon sparked a vigorous debate about the likely impact of the 
investigation on prospects for negotiation and reconciliation.  At one point, 
a delegation of senior Ugandan civil society representatives appealed to the 
prosecutor to drop the case.  In essence, their argument was that the ICC’s 
most important contribution to preventing future atrocities would be 
discontinuing its investigation.88  The prosecutor met with the elders and 
promised to take work cooperatively.89  He pointedly declined to offer 
immunity or end the investigation although he did express a willingness to 
consider delaying the investigation if he was convinced that it was not 
serving the interests of justice.90   
Should the prosecutor decide to adopt that line of reasoning, the Rome 
Statute provides him with a mechanism to decline a formal investigation as 
a matter of discretion even when the admissibility requirements are met.  
Article 53(1)(c) provides that the prosecutor may decline to open an 
investigation when “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice.”91  In September 2007, the OTP 
produced a policy paper on this provision in an effort to clarify how it might 
be used.92  It stated that use of the “interests of justice” provision would be 
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exceptional.93  The OTP noted that Article 53 essentially requires a 
balancing test, and it acknowledged that alternative justice processes (i.e., 
truth commissions) and the existence of peace and reconciliation efforts 
might be relevant to this balancing.  But the OTP pointed out that the 
Security Council has the power to delay proceedings and insisted that 
questions of peace and security are not its responsibility.94  This 
interpretation makes it unlikely that the court will explicitly decline 
jurisdiction based on the possibility that its involvement could prolong 
conflict and thus encourage, rather than prevent, future atrocities, although 
this possibility may of course factor into the prosecutor’s decision about 
whether to seek a formal investigation in the first place. 
As an empirical matter, the OTP has appeared to cast doubt on the idea 
that pursuing justice can threaten peace processes or worsen violence.  In a 
paper released during the Kampala Review Conference, the prosecutor’s 
special adviser on prevention argued forcefully that none of the ICC’s cases 
to date suggest that justice efforts have hampered peace processes.  He 
presented evidence that indictments in Sudan, in particular, galvanized 
rather than complicated diplomatic efforts.  “Efforts to bring President Al 
Bashir to justice did not hamper peace,” he asserted, “they may well have 
had a decisive role in fostering it.”95  The paper essentially argued that the 
oft–discussed tension between justice and peace does not exist.  If this 
reflects the thinking within the OTP, it is very unlikely that the prosecutor 
will pursue prevention by staying his hand.      
2.  A Deterrence Test?  The “Gravity Requirement” 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which addresses issues of admissibility, 
sets out several situations in which cases will be inadmissible.  At both the 
stage of initiating formal investigations and at the stage of issuing warrants 
or filing charges, the pre–trial chamber must ensure that situations and cases 
meet these requirements.96  This process of review has occasioned explicit 
discussion about the court’s preventive function.   
Subsections 1(a) and 1(b) together exclude those cases that are being or 
have been genuinely investigated by competent national authorities: these 
provisions effectuate the court’s well–known complementarity requirement 
and were debated at length during the Rome Conference.97  Subsection 1(c) 
declares inadmissible cases in which the person concerned has already been 
tried.  Subsection 1(d) provides a distinct test: It provides that a case will be 
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inadmissible if it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.” 98  This provision appears potentially redundant, given that Articles 
5, 7 and 8 of the Statute emphasize that the court should consider crimes 
that are large–scale or systematic, and define certain crimes accordingly.99  
The Rome Statute’s drafting history does not provide clear guidance on 
the precise purpose of this separate Article 17 gravity requirement, and the 
concept of gravity is not defined in the Statute or in the court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  Indeed, as William Schabas has argued, “the issue 
of gravity was virtually ignored in the negotiations of the Rome Statute, and 
did not manifest itself as an important question until well after the Court had 
begun to operate.”100  The provision first appeared during proceedings of the 
International Law Commission, which produced an early draft treaty, and 
was apparently intended as a mechanism for allowing the court to manage 
its caseload and prevent it from being overburdened with minor cases.  The 
provision remained in subsequent drafts even as the definition of the crimes 
under the court’s jurisdiction was altered to include only the most serious.101  
In reviewing the prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants for Congolese 
militia leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and his deputy, Bosco Ntaganda, the 
pre–trial chamber (“PTC”) examined in some depth the meaning of this 
“gravity” threshold for admissibility.102  The chamber noted that the 
provision is separate from the gravity considerations included in the 
selection of the crimes under Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute and should 
consequently be analyzed as a distinct requirement.  Moreover, the judges 
held that the court has no choice but to assess whether a case meets the 
gravity requirement.  “The Statute leaves the Chamber no discretion as to 
the declaration of the inadmissibility of a case once it is satisfied that the 
case ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’”103  
The PTC also determined that the hurdle provided by the provision must be 
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cleared twice: once when an investigation is initiated and again when a case 
is brought.104  
On the substance of the gravity requirement, the chamber found that (1) 
the conduct in question must be either systematic or large–scale; and (2) 
that “due consideration must be given to the social alarm such conduct may 
have caused in the international community.”105  Drawing on the reference 
to prevention in the Rome Statute’s preamble, the chamber concluded that 
17(1)(d) required that prosecutions only be initiated against those senior 
leaders who have committed systematic or large–scale crimes.  At the root 
of this reasoning was the view that deterrence was a principal objective of 
the court, and that the gravity requirement is “a key tool provided by the 
drafters to maximize the Court’s deterrent effect.”106  The chamber reasoned 
that “only by concentrating on this type of individual can the deterrence 
effects of the activities of the Court be maximized because other senior 
leaders in similar circumstances will know that solely by doing what they 
can to prevent the systematic or large–scale commission of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court can they be sure that they will not be 
prosecuted by the Court.”107 
The chamber found further support for its reasoning in the principles and 
rules of international law.  Specifically, it cited UN Security Council 
resolutions calling on the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), as part of their completion strategy, to concentrate on 
“the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes . . . 
.”108  For the judges, the fact that the ICC is a permanent rather than an ad 
hoc institution heightened the importance of “ensuring the effectiveness of 
the Court in carrying out its deterrence function and maximizing the 
deterrence effect of its activities.”109  On the facts presented to it, the 
chamber found that the case against Lubanga met this test but that the case 
against Ntaganda did not.  According to the judges, not enough evidence 
was presented that Ntaganda, as the third in command of the militia, “was a 
core actor in the decision–making.”110  The case against him was 
accordingly declared inadmissible.111 
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The substance of the chamber’s ruling aside, the decision was an 
important signal that the judges were inclined to play an active role in 
supervising the OTP’s work and that they would not hesitate to express 
themselves on prosecutorial strategy and policy goals.  Indeed, the chamber 
appeared eager to begin filling in the interstices of the Rome Statute and to 
provide principles that would guide the court in its choice of cases and 
prosecutions.   
Several months after the PTC issued its decision, the court’s appeals 
chamber rejected this reading of the gravity requirement.112  In reviewing 
the refusal to grant the arrest warrant, the appeals chamber found that the 
pre–trial chamber had erroneously created an additional requirement at the 
admissibility stage that conduct in question must be “systematic or large–
scale.”113  The appeals chamber reasoned that such a requirement would 
render meaningless other provisions of the Rome Statute.114  The judges also 
found no support for the “social alarm” test set forth by the pre–trial 
chamber, and it directly questioned the pre–trial chamber’s reasoning on 
deterrence.  In particular, it argued that excluding cases against all lower–
level perpetrators might actually weaken the deterrent effect of the court.   
“It seems more logical to assume that the deterrent effect of the Court is 
highest if no category of perpetrators is per se excluded from potentially 
being brought before the Court.”115  The appeals chamber also expanded on 
the issue of the Court’s broader preventive function: 
The imposition of rigid standards primarily based on top seniority may 
result in neither retribution nor prevention being achieved.  Also, the 
capacity of individuals to prevent crimes in the field should not be 
implicitly or inadvertently assimilated to the preventive role of the Court 
more generally.  Whether prevention is interpreted as a long–term 
objective, i.e. the overall result of the Court’s activities generally, or as a 
factor in a specific situation, the preventive role of the Court may depend 
on many factors, much broader than the capacity of the individual to 
prevent crimes.116 
On the broad issue of the court’s preventive function, the appeals 
chamber here showed itself to be essentially agnostic on whether prevention 
should be conceived of as a byproduct of the court’s activity or whether it 
should factor into the court’s decision-making.  While the appeals chamber 
rejected the pre–trial chamber’s reasoning, it did not exclude the possibility 
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that the concept of gravity might still involve consideration of the deterrent 
impact of an investigation or case.  It appears unlikely that 17(1)(d) will 
ultimately be interpreted to require such an assessment; the provision’s text 
and the Rome Statute more broadly cannot support such an interpretation.  
The ICC prosecutor has acknowledged at several points that his office is in 
the process of defining and putting into practice the concept of gravity,117 
and it appears that the chambers are engaged in the same process.  
3. The Conduct of Investigations 
Once the pre–trial chamber has authorized a formal investigation, the 
OTP has responsibility for “extend[ing] the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
responsibility under this Statute . . . .”118  The interests of victims and 
witnesses and the nature of the crime should play a significant role in the 
development of an investigative strategy.119  Throughout the Rome Statute, 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the OTP’s own guidelines make 
the protection and wellbeing of victims a high priority during 
investigations.120  
The court’s apparent commitment to both the protection of victims and 
maximizing its preventive effect creates the possibility of tension.  What 
best serves the victims of crimes already committed may not necessarily be 
best for those facing ongoing or imminent violence.  This tension 
manifested itself during the early stages of the court’s investigation into 
crimes committed in the Darfur region of Sudan.  Specifically, the question 
arose as to whether the court’s investigations and the presence of ICC 
personnel can mitigate or restrain ongoing violence and atrocities by 
making visible the threat of prosecution.  The UN Security Council had 
referred the case of Darfur to the ICC in March 2005, and the Prosecutor 
formally opened its first investigation in June of that year.121  In July, the 
pre–trial chamber, acting through Article 103 of the Rome Statute, invited 
observations from certain eminent international jurists on aspects of the 
court’s investigation there, notably the protection of victims.122   
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In response to the pre–trial chamber’s request, Louise Arbour, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, submitted observations.123  
She criticized the ICC prosecutor for not conducting investigations in 
Darfur and for instead relying primarily on refugees and displaced persons 
for witness testimony.  Arbour contended that in crafting its investigative 
strategy the ICC had placed too much emphasis on the possible risks to 
witnesses and victims and too little on the benefits that an active 
investigation in Darfur might yield.  She encouraged the prosecutor to 
consider “the potential deterrent effect of ICC investigations on the 
perpetrators of the very crimes that put the civilian population at risk and 
thus of its impact on the general reduction of violence.”124  The presence of 
ICC investigators “can create an atmosphere in which the costs of abuse are 
more apparent to the perpetrators of violence against civilians.”125 The 
ICC’s position in the international system, she argued, makes it particularly 
suited to targeted deterrence: 
The High Commissioner is of the view that the promise of the ICC is that, 
contrary to ad hoc tribunals created ex post facto, it has the potential of 
being effective during armed conflicts and to contribute to the effective 
prevention of current crimes and general reduction of violence.  The ICC’s 
potential power of deterrence can thus be more situation–specific and 
makes it a tool without equivalent for the international community. . . .126 
A few weeks later, the OTP responded to the Arbour observations.127  
The Prosecutor acknowledged the reference to prevention in the Rome 
Statute’s preamble but insisted that the office cannot be expected to help 
provide physical security in a conflict zone: 
The OTP has expressed on many occasions the firm belief in the deterrent 
power of ICC investigations and prosecutions and the objective of 
maximizing the deterrent effects of its activities.  Still, the OTP’s mandate 
cannot reasonably be expanded to encompass a duty to protect the security 
of civilians in areas in which it has chosen not to investigate.  As the 
Preamble acknowledges, deterrence is a consequence of prosecution and 
accountability, not an independent objective.128  
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The responsibility for security and prevention in Darfur, argued the 
prosecutor, lies with the government of Sudan and with the UN Security 
Council.  As an empirical matter, the prosecutor’s office also cast doubt on 
whether an increased international presence has any deterrent effect.  It 
noted that in the context of the Darfur conflict, “increased international 
presence . . . has not had the effect of reducing the level of violence in the 
region.”129  
The OTP’s broad statement on the place of deterrence in the court’s 
work should likely be limited to the context of investigations.  Even in that 
limited sense, however, it is not clear that the prosecutor is persuaded by his 
argument that deterrence should not be an independent objective.  The 
prosecutor has regularly briefed the Security Council on the progress of the 
Sudan case, and those briefings have included several suggestions that the 
office would craft its strategy so as to halt ongoing atrocities.  He has also 
stated that prevention will affect how the office directs its resources:  
The impact of ICC investigations and prosecutions on the prevention of 
future crimes is also an important consideration, and particular attention 
will therefore be given to investigating the crimes currently affecting the 
lives and safety of the two million displaced civilians, in an effort to 
contribute to their protection from further attack and to the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.130 
The prosecutor does not make clear whether he expects OTP’s activities 
to prevent ongoing crimes through deterrence or through the arrest and 
incapacitation of those responsible.  In either case, this policy might suggest 
that the prosecutor is willing to complicate investigations in order to 
maximize the preventive impact.  Ongoing crimes could be significantly 
harder to investigate than those committed months or years in the past, 
particularly given the investigative approach the OTP has taken in Darfur.  
Eyewitnesses and victims of the most recent crimes might not be in refugee 
camps and might be therefore out of reach for investigators.  Moreover, it 
can be expected that senior commanders and government officials are now 
more adept at disguising responsibility for crimes than they were in the 
early stages of the conflict.    
Taken together, the prosecutor’s exchange with Arbour and his briefings 
to the Security Council suggest a calibrated approach to prevention at the 
investigate stage: the prosecutor will consider prevention in crafting an 
investigation and prosecution strategy but will not allow prevention or 
deterrence to influence decisions on where investigators are deployed.  In 
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essence, the prosecutor has argued that it may be appropriate for the court to 
become an instrument of prevention, but not its personnel.     
4. Choice of Charges 
Once the prosecutor has identified individuals against whom it will bring 
charges, there remains the question of precisely what charges to bring.  The 
PTC must approve of charges filed, but the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure offer no guidance on how the prosecutor should 
choose the precise charges to bring or whether he should prioritize certain 
crimes over others.  The OTP’s regulations provide that the investigative 
team “shall aim to select incidents reflective of the most serious crimes and 
the main types of victimization—including sexual and gender violence and 
violence against children—and which are the most representative of the 
scale and impact of the crimes.”131 
In its early cases, the OTP targeted several individuals against whom it 
was possible to bring a variety of different charges.  Militia leaders in the 
Congo, for example, have been accused of committing or authorizing 
murder, rapes, pillage, and forced displacement, among a number of other 
crimes covered by the Rome Statute.  It is likely that this will be the 
situation in many of the court’s future cases.  The selection of charges 
therefore becomes an important element of the prosecutor’s discretion and 
could be used to maximize the court’s preventive impact.   
The court’s indictments related to the conflict in eastern Congo suggest 
just such a dynamic.  The three charges brought against Thomas Lubanga 
all involved the use of child soldiers.132  By emphasizing this theme, the 
prosecutor may have decided to help stigmatize a practice that is accepted 
as normal in some environments.  However common, murder and rape have 
a basic stigma attached to them, while recruiting child soldiers may not.  In 
media interviews as the case opened, Moreno-Ocampo stressed the broad 
effect he hoped the prosecution would have.  “The charges in the Lubanga 
case will reverberate around the world . . . in Sri Lanka, in Colombia, in 
many countries.  This trial will make clear that this is a law to be respected.  
If you conscript, enlist or use child soldiers you will have a problem, you 
will be prosecuted.”133  The prosecutor’s opening argument to the court 
continued the theme: “The Lubanga case, beyond the guilt or innocence of 
Mr Lubanga, is also a clear message to perpetrators of crimes against 
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children such as enlisting them as soldiers, are very grave and will be 
prosecuted.”134  
The prosecutor runs a risk in seeking to isolate and raise the profile of 
certain criminal behavior.  In the case of the Congo indictments, the court’s 
narrow focus elicited strong reactions from some quarters.  Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice confronted the prosecutor about the absence of 
sexually–based offenses:  
It is evident that if the Prosecutor, in the exercise of his or her discretion, 
chose never to prosecute certain types of crimes, the ICC would not have 
the effect of deterring those types of crimes.  Indeed, the ICC might in 
such circumstances send the signal that such crimes can be committed with 
impunity.  Thus, the selection of the particular charges against those who 
are accused is even more important than the overall number of accused.135   
If the court consciously decides to pursue an educative approach, it 
might, in some cases, seek to prioritize those crimes within its jurisdiction 
that are lesser known and where the educational impact can be maximized.  
As has been demonstrated, however, that approach runs the risk of 
alienating certain victims groups and those advocating on their behalf.  
5. The Preventive Effect of Indictment 
To date, the court has issued thirteen indictments, the majority of which 
remain unenforced, including those against Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir and Lord’s Resistance Army Commander Joseph Kony.  From a 
crime prevention standpoint, unenforced indictments can be analyzed in 
several different ways.  In the case of ongoing crimes, the ICC may hope 
that issuance of an indictment will lead the indicted individual to modify his 
or her behavior even if there is little prospect of the individual being 
apprehended.  In effect, the court might be seeking to achieve targeted 
deterrence that leads the indictee to abandon criminal behavior or at least 
restrictive deterrence that leads the indictee to reduce, if not completely 
abandon, criminal activity.  The court may also conclude that issuing 
indictments can have a general educative effect either on the society in 
question or in the international community as a whole.  As discussed above, 
this may particularly be the case when the indictments focus on crimes that 
are little known or not widely regarded as serious.    
  
 134. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/05, Opening 
Statement, 29 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/82809488-9418-4AA9-
BCF4-5FE3D609CBA7/279630/ICCOTPSTLMO20090126ENG2.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga, 
Opening Statement]. 
 135. Letter from Brigid Inder, Exec. Dir. of Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, to 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, 2 
http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/Prosecutor_Letter_August_2006_Redacted.pdf. 
2011] The International Criminal Court and Crime Prevention 193 
But unenforced indictments can serve to highlight the court’s lack of 
enforcement power and, potentially, to diminish its ultimate preventive and 
deterrent effect.  Senior government and non–state leaders in a position to 
prevent major crimes may conclude that the ICC’s indictments are unlikely 
to threaten them and therefore choose not to modify their behavior.  
Maintaining the court’s ability to affect the calculations of senior leaders—
an important element of preventive effect—may suggest a policy of issuing 
indictments only when it appears likely that enforcement will occur.  It is 
apparent that the court has not chosen this approach, at least not on a 
consistent basis.  There was little prospect, for example, that President 
Bashir would be apprehended when the court indicted him.  Going forward, 
the court will have to weigh these considerations and decide whether it 
should only seek indictments when the prospects for enforcement are high.   
There is another dimension to the court’s effort to use indictments to 
maximize its preventive effect.  As suggested by the Lubanga case, the 
court at times may find itself in the position to take into custody individuals 
who might not, under normal circumstances, be deemed significant enough 
to merit the ICC’s attentions but whose apprehension could help prevent 
future atrocities.  In this situation, the court must attempt to weigh that 
preventive effect and determine whether pursing an indictment is an 
appropriate use of the court’s resources.  Most accounts suggest that 
Lubanga, a militia leader who had been detained by the Congolese 
authorities, was set to be released.  When word of his imminent release 
reached The Hague, the OTP negotiated with the Congolese authorities to 
transfer Lubanga to the ICC, and the office moved quickly to seek an 
indictment.136  The suspect’s likely release was discussed at some length 
before the pre–trial chamber as it considered whether to authorize an arrest 
warrant.137  Several commentators have argued that the ICC’s focus on 
preventing Lubanga’s release trumped its normal standards for assessing the 
seriousness of a situation.  “One might wonder . . . whether the selection of 
the Lubanga case was based on gravity or by his ‘possible imminent 
release.’”138  From a prevention standpoint, however, the chance to remove 
a dangerous individual from the conflict zone—and perhaps avoid or limit 
imminent atrocities—may be hard for the court to ignore.139 
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C. Sentencing 
The guidelines for sentencing at the ICC are elaborated in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, but they do not include any reference to the 
deterrence function or indeed to any of the traditional purposes of 
punishment.  “The ICC Statute is in effect silent on the purposes and 
principles that govern the rules on sentencing.”140  Rule 145(a) calls for the 
Court to “balance all the relevant factors, including any mitigating and 
aggravating factors and consider the circumstances both of the convicted 
person and of the crime . . . .”141  The Rules outline certain relevant 
considerations including the damage caused; degree of intent; and the age, 
education, and social and economic condition of the convicted person.  A 
number of aggravating and mitigating conditions are also listed, but none of 
them relate specifically to prevention or deterrence.  The only sentencing 
provision that can be considered to focus on prevention appears in Rule 223, 
which addresses the possible reduction of sentences.  It instructs the court to 
consider whether early release “would give rise to significant social 
instability.”142  The provision appears to anticipate a situation in which the 
release of a controversial individual would lead to protests, political 
instability, or even violence and atrocities.  It may also encompass the 
possibility that the individual released may commit or instigate additional 
crimes.  As such, it can be considered to have a preventive purpose. 
The experience of the ICTY and ICTR on sentencing suggests that even 
in the absence of statutory guidance, the court will likely begin to articulate 
a sentencing philosophy, although not necessarily a comprehensive one.143  
Both of those tribunals adopted the practice of issuing sentencing decisions, 
and on several occasions they specifically addressed the question of 
sentencing’s preventive impact, always in deterrence terms.  In the Tadic 
case, the judges determining the sentence went so far as to declare that 
“deterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of 
  
impression remains that in the Lubanga case, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion had 
more to do with the fact that this was an accused who was accessible to a Court starved for 
trial work rather than any compelling analysis based upon either gravity or 
complementarity.” Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10, at 744. 
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appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”144  
The ICTR also suggested that deterrence should have pride of place in 
sentencing decisions:  
It is clear that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by 
the Tribunal must be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said 
accused, who must see their crimes punished, and over and above that, on 
the other hand, at deterrence, namely to dissuade for good, others who may 
be tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing that that 
the international community shall not tolerate the serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights.145 
The first indication of the OTP’s approach to sentencing came in the 
Lubanga case.  In his opening statement, the prosecutor signaled that he 
would seek harsh punishment for the accused:   
I want to put the Defence on notice that the prosecution anticipates to call 
for a severe punishment, close to the maximum.  The Prosecution believes 
that the massive crimes litigated in this International Criminal Court, with 
hundreds or thousands of victims, with entire communities affected, 
warrant very high penalties.  In this case, the defendant stole the childhood 
of the victims by forcing them to kill and rape.146 
One should be wary of extrapolating from this statement a defined 
philosophy of sentencing, but the prosecutor’s statement does suggest an 
emphasis on retribution and “just deserts” rather than prevention, a notable 
departure from the emphasis that the OTP placed on stigmatizing and 
deterring the recruitment of children in other public statements before and 
during the trial.  The ICC judges, for their part, have not yet had the 
opportunity to elaborate their own approach to sentencing.   
D. Public Outreach  
The ICTY and the ICTR were often criticized, particularly in their first 
years of operation, for being distant from and little understood by the people 
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most affected by their activities.147  Responding to these concerns, the ICC 
has developed an active outreach program to publicize and explain the work 
of the ICC, particularly in countries where active investigations are 
underway.  
The court’s strategic plan for outreach acknowledges that the institution 
is designed to help foster “long–lasting respect for and enforcement of 
international criminal justice, the prevention of such crimes, and the fight 
against impunity.”148  The prosecutor’s office has stressed the importance of 
explaining court activity so that “ICC investigations and prosecutions, and 
in particular the conduct charged . . . are known to all parties to conflicts in 
order to deter perpetrators.”149  However, prevention is not listed as one of 
the explicit goals of the outreach program itself, and perpetrators or 
potential perpetrators are not discussed as target audiences.150  The strategic 
plan does refer somewhat obliquely to prevention when it discusses 
directing information about the court specifically to those involved in 
conflicts.  “Stigmatised by their families and/or the ethnic groups to which 
they belong for their active participation in hostilities, they represent a 
volatile segment of the society and could be the source of significant 
instability.”151  Describing combatants in these terms alone appears to 
intentionally avoid casting them as potential perpetrators of atrocities and to 
minimize the implication that the outreach program has an explicit deterrent 
purpose. 
In practice, the court’s outreach program has focused on those countries 
where formal investigations are underway.  The court has established 
offices and stationed some personnel in the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Uganda.  On its own, this 
choice of limiting major outreach activities to these societies suggests 
limited ambition as regards prevention.  These societies have already 
experienced extreme violence and, as targets of formal investigations that 
often receive significant media attention, may be least in need of education 
about the court’s existence.  From a broad prevention standpoint, a focus on 
vulnerable societies that have not yet experienced major violence might be 
more effective.     
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The content of the court’s outreach activities reflects a strong emphasis 
on normative and educative approaches and a very limited use of 
deterrence.  Principal outreach strategies have included meetings with civil 
society representatives, question–and–answer sessions about the work of the 
court, special briefings for local media, information sessions at schools and 
universities, coordination with relevant non–governmental organizations, 
screenings of court proceedings, and selected radio messages.  In Uganda, 
for example, the ICC reports that almost 21,000 people participated in more 
than 200 interactive sessions and that ICC radio messages may have reached 
eight million people.152 
Targeted groups have included victims groups, former child soldiers, and 
women.  Court officials have designed information sessions for them that 
have included tailored messages on the rights of victims, the crime of child 
recruitment, and sexual crimes, respectively.153  In some instances, the court 
has sought to seek out populations that might be skeptical of or even hostile 
to the court’s work.  In Congo, for example, the court arranged information 
sessions in areas of the country where support for indictee Jean–Pierre 
Bemba is high.154 
It is notable, however, that the ICC has rarely attempted to communicate 
targeted messages to senior government officials, military representatives, 
or militia commanders about their responsibilities or the threat of 
punishment (the prosecutor’s December 2010 statement on Cote d’Ivoire 
being a notable exception).  It is possible that this type of communication 
occurs more regularly behind the scenes,  but in general, the outreach effort 
has focused on education rather than targeted deterrence.  Given the court’s 
ambition to alter the calculations of senior leaders, this omission is striking.  
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that, in the abstract, the ICC prosecutor and 
judges see crime prevention as an important objective of the court’s work.   
The court’s Special Adviser on Crime Prevention concedes that “our task is 
very complicated and difficult,” but argues that the court has no choice but 
to engage with the complexities of measuring and assessing the institution’s 
preventive impact: 
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[W]e have a legal but also a moral and political obligation to engage in 
prevention and to study the way justice can serve the purposes of 
prevention in specific an detailed ways.  We will probably never have the 
specific evidence because we prosecute and punish this particular case 
[that] we prevented similar cases to happen in this jurisdiction or in others.  
But our ability to make arguments that justice is what contributes to a 
preventive mechanism is important.155  
His comments suggest that the court’s prevention discourse may be as 
much about justification as strategy.  More than eight years after it opened 
its doors, the court still has no convictions.  A significant number of the 
individuals it has indicted remain at large.  Tension has emerged between 
the court and many African member states over the emphasis on African 
conflicts.  The court’s first trial has been characterized by repeated sparring 
between the prosecutor and the judges and may not be completed.156  In this 
context, discussion of the court’s preventive effect and potential can easily 
become a gloss to cover the absence of more concrete and quantifiable 
achievements.   
At the very least, it is apparent that the broad goal of prevention is not 
yet accompanied by a coherent strategy on how to do so.  One close 
observer of the court concluded that “the potential of preventive impact is 
widely unexplored.  It requires a systematic approach and use.”157  The 
evidence to this point suggests that the ICC prosecutor is particularly 
interested in the preventive impact of preliminary investigations and has 
sought to maximize that effect through frequent and targeted public 
statements.  The court is also pursuing an active outreach campaign that 
emphasizes information and education as a preventive tool.   
Beyond that, the place of prevention appears uncertain.  The prosecutor 
and his office have sometimes claimed that prevention and deterrence 
cannot be conscious goals of the institution and at other times have 
suggested that they are key objectives.  The OTP’s discussion of its 
preventive role at the investigation phase captures this uncertainty well.  
The appeals chamber, for its part, declined the opportunity to state clearly 
whether prevention should be conceived of as a byproduct or conscious goal 
of the court’s work.    
It is not surprising that the ICC’s approach to crime prevention is 
fragmented and, at times, inconsistent.  The absence of clear guidance from 
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the Rome Statute and the court’s other published rules and guidelines create 
fertile ground for uncertainty.  For an institution like the ICC, that lack of 
clarity may ultimately be an advantage; many international organizations 
use ambiguity in their underlying charters in an attempt to shape their 
mandate—converting ambiguity into a form of autonomy.158 While the ICC 
will undoubtedly engage in this process, its senior officials are sensitive to 
accusations that they are abusing their discretion.  Prominent court critics 
have pointed out the danger of the court’s broad discretion and lack of 
oversight.159  In response, the prosecutor and other court officials have 
declared that they will not seek to engage in ambitious interpretations of the 
court’s role.  “I have to respect scrupulously my legal limits,” Moreno–
Ocampo said recently.  “Our policy is never to stretch the interpretation of 
the norms adopted in Rome.”160 As a new institution, the ICC faces an 
imperative to establish its place in international politics and to demonstrate 
its effectiveness.  In so doing it must respond pragmatically and flexibly to 
events.  At least until the court is better established, consistency will often 
have to yield to expediency.   
There are other significant hurdles to a well developed prevention 
strategy.  The difficulties of measuring and analyzing the preventive effects 
of criminal justice are well documented.161 Those difficulties are 
compounded for the ICC because the small number of prosecutions offers 
limited data for empirical study and because it is difficult to assess the 
calculations of those targeted by the court.  Moreover, conducting 
formalized and public assessments of the likely preventive effect of court 
action would involve political, social, and even psychological calculations 
that judicial bodies are hesitant and usually ill–equipped to make.     
Still, within these constraints, there is room for the court to improve and 
systematize its approach to prevention.  Either within the OTP or the 
registry, the court should develop a small prevention unit with two principal 
tasks: assessing the likely impact of possible investigations and recording 
and analyzing the effects of ongoing investigations and cases.  In particular, 
the court should develop a set of prevention guidelines for use as it 
considers information it has received and referrals from states parties and 
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the Security Council.  These guidelines might include the following 
considerations: 
Whether there is ongoing conflict that a preliminary or formal 
investigation might help mitigate. 
If conflict is not ongoing, an assessment of how likely it is that 
violence will recur and how the court’s involvement might affect that 
possibility. 
Whether political and military leaders thought to be involved in 
committing atrocities will be susceptible to the pressure of an ICC 
investigation. 
The degree of attention that an ICC investigation will likely garner in 
the country and region. 
Whether the situation would expose types of international crimes that 
are underpublicized and thereby contribute substantially to the building of 
awareness. 
While the guidelines should be published as part of a broader policy 
paper on prevention, the court’s assessment should be conducted internally 
and without rendering formal decisions or evaluations.  The efforts of the 
pre–trial chamber regarding the gravity requirement notwithstanding, it 
would not be fruitful or plausible to read into the Rome Statute a formal 
prevention requirement.  Without structured internal guidance, however, 
there is a danger that the focus on prevention may begin to fade as other 
achievements accumulate.  That would be unfortunate.  For all its rhetoric, 
the court has only begun to explore systematically its preventive potential.     
 
